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Abstract
We use several well-being measures that combine average income with a mea-
sure of inequality to undertake intertemporal and global comparisons of well-being.
The conclusions emerging from the intertemporal analysis are that the impact of
these measures on temporal trends in well-being is relatively small on average, but
changing across the decades. In particular, it suggests that changes in well-being
were understated in the 1960s and 1970s and overstated in the 1980s and 1990s.
Our global analysis covering ca. 81 per cent of the world’s population demonstrates
that global well-being is at least 50 per cent smaller than world per capita income
if the unequal income distribution is also factored in. Conversely, growth in world
well-being has been larger than world income growth between 1970-1998. Since the
inclusion of inequality has an important impact on well-being comparisons, it is of
great importance to generate more consistent and intertemporally as well as inter-
nationally comparable data on inequality.
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11 Introduction
Despite its well-known short-comings (including well-known omissions, the neglect of stock
changes, the inclusion of defensive expenditures, etc.), GNP per capita is still the most
widely used indicator for comparisons of well-being across countries; and the per capita
growth rate is still the most common indicator of changes in well-being.1
The exclusive reliance on this measure is largely pragmatic. GNP as well as GDP are
important measures of production possibility and business cycles. Hence, great eﬀorts are
made to measure them timely, accurately, and according to internationally agreed stan-
dards. With these data readily available, it is tempting to rely on them for international
and intertemporal comparisons of well-being. Moreover, it is argued by some that GNP
per capita and growth of per capita income is still the best available proxy for changes in
well-being as it is highly correlated with more complete or more broad-based measures of
well-being (e.g. Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Ravallion, 1997).
Nevertheless, it continues to be the case that its neglect of income distribution is
one of the most serious and easily corrected short-comings of GNP as an indicator of
welfare. In particular, a broad range of philosophical approaches to the measurement of
welfare (ranging from utilitarianism with some very reasonable assumptions about utility
functions to Rawlsian reasoning or Sen’s capability approach) would suggest that, ceteris
paribus, high economic inequality reduces aggregate well-being. A range of measures for
well-being that make use of this insight and combine mean income with some measure of
income inequality arrive at better measures of welfare (and changes thereof) than average
income alone (e.g. Atkinson, 1970; Sen, 1973; Dagum, 1990; Ahluwalia and Chenery,
1974).
In the past the application of those measures was limited, mainly because of lack
of data on income distribution. Recent years, however, have seen great advances being
made in the generation of data on income inequality (e.g. Deininger and Squire, 1996;
Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; WIID, 2000). Thus it seems natural to apply well-being
measures that combine GNP per capita and income distribution to these new data and
investigate to what extent these measures will generate comparisons of well-being across
space and time that are substantially diﬀerent from pure per capita income comparisons.
While Gr¨ un and Klasen (2003) focuses on applying these measures to international com-
parisons of well-being for speciﬁc benchmark years, the focus of this paper is to examine
intertemporal and global comparisons of well-being using such inequality-adjusted well-
being measures. In the process, we will also be able to examine trends in between- and
within-country inequality over time as well as changes in global inequality and thus con-
tribute to the literature focusing on those debates (e.g. Cornia and Court, 2001; Milanovic,
2002; Ravallion, 2002).
The paper is organised as follows: the next section brieﬂy summarises the theoretical
issues involved in comparing well-being across time. Section 3 introduces the measures of
well-being we use in the paper. Section 4 discusses the data and our manipulations for
this analysis. Section 5 presents the results for the intertemporal analysis. Findings from
our global analysis are discussed in section 6 and section 7 concludes.
1There are other well-being indicators that have attempted to address some of the short-comings
of the GNP measure including Nordhaus and Tobin (1972); UNDP (2002); Osberg and Sharpe (2001);
World Bank (2002b). None of these, however, are primarily concerned with tackling the distributional
issue addressed here.
22 Well-Being and Real-Income Comparisons: Theo-
retical Considerations
Despite a long history, the theory of welfare judgements across space and time continues
to be beset with conceptual and practical problems2. Ever since it became evident that
social choice theory was not yielding acceptable3 procedures for making social welfare
judgements, such judgements have been based on axiomatic approaches to welfare mea-
surement. Those are based on a conceptualisation of what constitutes welfare and then the
derivation of an indicator that, under certain stated assumptions, can adequately measure
the chosen concept.
Applying such measures to welfare comparisons across space and time generates ad-
ditional problems. Those are discussed in detail in Sen (1982, 1984) and will only be
summarized here. In particular, the theory of welfare comparisons is based on situational
comparisons, i.e. whether a person would hypothetically prefer situation A to B. This
comparison thus takes place at the same time and is done by the same person. Intertem-
poral comparisons, as undertaken here, however, address a diﬀerent question. They have
to contend with the problem that the persons are not evaluating the welfare of two situa-
tions simultaneously, but sequentially. This may generate problems if overall perceptions
of welfare or tastes have changed over time (in addition to the problem that not all the
people are alive in both periods).
For a global analysis, the aggregation of incomes poses an additional practical problem,
that of the appropriate exchange rate. In recent years, the International Comparison
Programme (ICP)4 has generated purchasing power parity estimates of GDP and GNP
based on international prices that try to address this particular short-coming.5
Thus, there are some important conceptual questions that relate to such comparisons.
Only if one places restrictions on intertemporal changes and international diﬀerences in
preferences, these comparisons can yield meaningful outcomes. Given the ubiquity of such
comparisons, it appears that most analysts are willing to make such assumptions.
The most commonly used indicator for welfare comparisons across space and time is
real per capita income. It can be derived from utilitarian welfare economics, thus focusing
on a consequentialist approach to welfare measurement, using three alternative sets of as-
sumptions. One set would demand everyone to have identical unchanging cardinal utility
2For a related discussion, see also Gr¨ un and Klasen (2001) and Gr¨ un and Klasen (2003).
3Acceptable is meant in the sense of obeying minimal requirements such as the four conditions stated
by Arrow in his famous impossibility result (Arrow, 1963). See also Sen (1973, 1999) for a discussion.
4The ICP produces estimates of the economies’ main aggregates adjusted for purchasing power diﬀer-
ences in benchmark years, which are then interpolated and extrapolated to non-benchmark years.(UN,
1992). Unfortunately, not all countries participate in each round of the survey, including China that never
participated and India who participated last in 1985. For these countries, PPP conversion factors had to
be estimated which limits the reliability of estimates for those countries.
5While the data generated by these methods are widely used, they are not beyond question. In partic-
ular, the resulting adjusted per capita incomes are sensitive to the choice of ’international prices’ which
is closer to the prices prevailing in rich countries (Berry, Bourguignon, and Morrison, 1991; Hill, 2000).
Moreover, as shown by Gr¨ un and Klasen (2003), PPP adjustments can diﬀer in their outcomes as the
diﬀerences between the World Bank estimates and the Penn World Tables demonstrate. For a critical
assessment of the concept and current use of PPP in the context of poverty measurement see Reddy and
Pogge (2002).
3functions where income (or consumption)6 enters the utility function linearly (e.g. in the
simplest form, every unit of consumption generates one unit of utility). An alternative
set of assumptions could allow for more realistic concave utility functions, but would still
require identical utility functions and require in addition that everyone is earning the per
capita income and thus consumes the mean commodity bundle (Sen, 1984). A third set
is based on Samuelson (1947) and takes an ’individualistic approach’ to welfare measure-
ment. Under this approach, social welfare is recovered from individual welfare based on
revealed preferences using the Pareto principle. If preferences are complete, convex, and
monotonically increasing, if each person’s welfare only depends on her purchases (i.e. no
externalities and public goods), if there are no market imperfections on the buyer’s side,
and if each person is rational in the sense that her choices reﬂect her welfare ranking, then
the ratio of market prices should equal the ratio of intra-personal weights (marginal rates
of substitution) attached to these goods. These assumptions are not suﬃcient, however,
to ensure that the market prices say anything about the valuation of a good going to
two diﬀerent people, as this requires interpersonal comparisons. To be able to make such
interpersonal comparisons, which are necessary for all real income comparisons, one has to
assume in addition that the income distribution is ’optimal’ in the sense that the ethical
worth of each person’s marginal dollar is equal (Samuelson, 1947).
All three sets of assumptions are problematic. While many aspects of the various
approaches appear unrealistic, the need to explicitly ignore the distribution of income in
a welfare comparison is particularly unpalatable. In fact, both theoretical considerations
(e.g. declining marginal utility of income derived from convex preferences) as well as
empirical observations (e.g. about risk aversion and insurance as well as subjective well-
being) clearly suggest that utility functions are not linear in income or consumption, nor
that the existing distribution of incomes is ’optimal’ from a social welfare point of view.7
Instead, these theoretical and empirical considerations point to concave or interdependent
utility functions, i.e. inequality reduces aggregate welfare as the marginal utility of income
among the poor is much higher than among the rich.8
Non-utilitarian views of welfare would also suggest that income inequality reduces
aggregate well-being. For example, Sen’s capability approach (Sen, 1987) which calls for
a maximisation of people’s capability to function (e.g. the capability to be healthy, well-
nourished, adequately housed, etc.) also exhibits declining marginal returns in the income
space.9 Similarly, application of Rawlsian principles would also suggest that welfare is
higher in societies where inequality is lower (Rawls, 1971).10
6We abstract from the diﬃculties associated with the treatment of saving in an indicator of welfare.
For a discussion, see Osberg and Sharpe (2002).
7See for example Alesina, Di Tella, and MacCulloch (2002) who show with the help of U.S. happiness
data and the Euro-Barometer Survey Series that income inequality negatively aﬀects the utility level of
individuals, even though personal characteristics like individual income are controlled for. For similar
ﬁndings, see Blanchﬂower and Oswald (2003); Schwarze and H¨ arpfer (2002).
8This is inherent also in the approach by Graaf (1957) and Sen (1982) who treat the same good going
to two diﬀerent people as two diﬀerent goods and thus explicitly do away with the distinction between
size and distribution of income as the ’welfare depends on them both’ (Sen, 1982).
9For example, there appears to be a concave relationship between income and life expectancy, and
income and educational achievement. For a discussion, see Klasen (1994).
10In the lexicographic version of the maximin principle, only the position of the worst oﬀ is relevant; if
one generalises a bit, one would get a more continuous declining marginal valuation of income. Similarly,
Hirsch’s views on the social limits to growth also imply declining aggregate well-being as a result of
inequality. For details see Hirsch (1977) and Klasen (1994).
4One approach to improve upon the welfare content of real income comparisons is there-
fore to jettison this neglect of income distribution and account for the welfare-reducing
eﬀect of inequality, which would be consistent with reasonable assumptions in a utilitarian
or the above-mentioned non-utilitarian views of welfare.11 Each of the measures proposed
in the next chapter does precisely this in slightly diﬀerent ways.
Before turning to this issue, however, it seems useful to consider one explicit objec-
tion to the incorporation of distributional issues in an assessment of well-being. It could
be argued that higher inequality will lead to higher subsequent growth rates, so that
one should explicitly consider this trade-oﬀ in a welfare assessment. The reason for such
trade-oﬀ might be related to higher inequality promoting savings12 or to the incentive
problems associated with redistribution policies (often relying on progressive taxation of
labor earnings and proﬁts).
While this is a potentially powerful argument, it is just one of many dynamic consid-
erations that would need to be considered in an intertemporal assessment of well-being.
Other issues to be considered in such an intertemporal assessment would include the role
of savings, longevity, human capital accumulation, population dynamics, depreciation of
natural, physical, and human capital.13 These issues go beyond the scope of this paper.14
In addition, there is a growing consensus that this trade-oﬀ between distribution and
growth does not exist. In fact, if anything, the debate has recently shifted in the opposite
direction suggesting that initial inequality lowers subsequent growth prospects rather
than increases them (e.g. Deininger and Squire, 1998; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Clarke,
1995; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Klasen, 2002). While these ﬁndings are still tentative
and subject to some debate,15 they suggest that the older claim, that high inequality is
necessary for growth, does not seem to be born out by the facts (see also Klasen, 1994).
3 Inequality-Adjusted Well-Being Measures
This section describes the well-being measures that jointly consider per capita income
and its distribution and therefore avoid the particularly problematic neglect of income
11This approach would also retain the consequentialist logic of the utilitarian calculus which evaluates
a state of aﬀairs by the consequences it generates, with no emphasis on procedural issues. One might
argue, however, that it is important to consider inequality also for procedural questions as high inequality
eﬀectively limits the choices for those at the bottom of the distribution. For a discussion, see Sen (1999).
12Assuming a Keynesian consumption function, a more unequal distribution of income leads to higher
aggregate savings which is one of the main determinants of per capita income (and, at least in the short
run, the growth thereof) in any growth model.
13For a discussion of some of these issues, see for example World Bank (2002b); Berry, Bourguignon,
and Morrison (1991).
14Thus we will also not be able to deal with the potentially interesting but conceptually and empirically
very diﬃcult issue of life-time incomes and its distribution, which has to take into account both the life-
time income proﬁle of incomes as well as an assessment of the distribution of longevity.
15See, for example, Forbes (2000) and Lundberg and Squire (2001). The last-named regard growth and
income inequality as jointly determined rather than one causing the other; they also ﬁnd that inequality
is particularly bad for income growth among poor countries, while it has a diﬀerent eﬀect for income
growth among richer countries; the former study ﬁnds that increases in income inequality in a country
appear to be correlated with higher growth in the subsequent ﬁve years, but there are serious questions
about the reliability of making inferences based on the small and error-prone intertemporal variation of
inequality data within a country over time.
5distribution in a consideration of welfare. Most are well-known in the inequality literature
although not all of them have been used explicitly for aggregate welfare comparisons. All
share the feature that they can be summarized by the following formula:
W = µ(1 − I), 0 ≤ I ≤ 1. (1)
Welfare W is a function of mean income µ, reduced by a measure of inequality I. Thus,
the existing degree of inequality adjusts mean income downward to reﬂect the welfare
loss associated with the (unequal) distribution of that mean income. Several measures
will be considered because there are diﬀerences with respect to the type and intensity of
the ’welfare penalty’ that is imposed. Also, the measures vary in the way they penalize
diﬀerent types of inequality.
The ﬁrst measure considered here was proposed by Sen (1982) and incorporates in-
equality by using the Gini coeﬃcient G:
S = µ(1 − G). (2)
The Sen measure can be derived by replacing Samuelson’s problematic ’optimal distri-
bution’ assumption by the assumption of ’rank order weighting’ (Sen, 1973). Individual
incomes will be weighted according to their rank in the income distribution (with the
richest person receiving rank 1 and thus the lowest weight for her income). It can also
be derived from a utility function where individuals consider not only their own income,
but the relation of their income to the entire income distribution (Dagum, 1990). Thus,
preferences are assumed to be interdependent which accords well with recent experimental
and empirical ﬁndings on inequality aversion and the link between income distribution
and reported well-being (e.g. Easterlin, 1995; Banerjee, 1997; Amiel, Creedy, and Hurn,
1999; Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 2003; Schwarze and H¨ arpfer, 2002; Alesina, Di Tella, and
MacCulloch, 2002). The measure also has a nice graphical illustration. As discussed by
Sen (1997), it represents twice the area below the generalized Lorenz Curve (which in
turn is the Lorenz curve scaled up by mean income).16








Clearly, the Dagum measure is a more extreme version of the Sen measure as it results
in a higher penalty for inequality. The Dagum measure is also based on interdependent
preferences and implies that people receive a further welfare penalty from the people ahead
of them in the income distribution which also appears to be a reasonable assumption.17
In addition, two versions of the Atkinson welfare measure are presented. The Atkinson
measure was developed as an indicator of inequality that explicitly considers the welfare
loss associated with inequality in the measure (Atkinson, 1970). But one can equally well
just use the way the welfare loss is calculated, the equally distributed equivalent income,
16It thus maps the population from poorest to richest on the x-axis to the cumulative income share
multiplied by mean income on the y-axis.
17See Dagum (1990) for a derivation and justiﬁcation of this measure.
6as the welfare measure itself.18 This equally distributed equivalent income is the amount
of income that, if distributed equally, would yield the same welfare as the actual mean
income and its present (unequal) distribution (Deaton, 1997). The general form of this













The measure depends crucially on the exponent ε, the aversion to inequality factor. The
higher ε, the higher the penalty for inequality. Two cases are studied explicitly, ε = 2,
denoted as A2, and ε = 1 (A1). In the latter case, the general form of the Atkinson







The Atkinson measures can be derived from social welfare functions that are additively
separable functions of the individual incomes xi. Thus they are based on individualistic
utility functions where people only care about their own incomes. Inequality reduces
welfare in this formulation as the utility functions considered are concave for all ε > 0. All
the measures exhibit constant relative risk aversion. The ε = 1 has the additional property
of being based on a constant elasticity utility function, suggesting that a percentage
increase in income is valued the same regardless of its recipient. Such an assumption has
quite a lot of intuitive appeal. While clearly ε = 2 penalises inequality more than ε = 1
and is thus based on declining elasticity of income, the underlying assumption, that at
twice the level of income, a percentage increase in income is valued half as much as at
the lower level of income, also appears to be within the range of reasonable presumptions
(see Deaton, 1997; UNDP, 1995). Such penalties of inequality are still consistent with
ﬁndings from the micro literature on utility and risk.20 Most of the non-utilitarian theories
suggested above would, in fact, require considerably higher inequality aversion.21
A third set of measures were proposed by Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974) which pre-
sented measures that combine income growth with redistribution. In particular, they
suggested a measure which they called a population-weighted or equal-weighted growth
rate which is simply the arithmetic average of the growth rates of each individual. Instead
of treating a dollar increase the same regardless of its recipient, this measure treats a per-
centage increase the same, thus also allowing for declining marginal utility of income and
exhibiting what they called the ’one person, one vote’ principle of growth measurement.
It turns out that this measure is a small-number approximation of the Atkinson ε = 1
18This has been done, for example, for Britain by Jenkins (1997) and also by UNDP in deriving the
gender-related development index (UNDP, 1995). For a discussion of this index, see Bardhan and Klasen
(1999).
19This measure also satisﬁes the general form of the well-being measure W = µ(1−I) where I = 1 − A
µ .
See Atkinson (1970) for discussion.
20For diﬀerent ways to measure inequality aversion and their results, see Stodder (1991); Amiel, Creedy,
and Hurn (1999). See also discussion below.
21A strict interpretation of Rawls lexicographic maximin principle would require ε to be inﬁnite (see
also Atkinson, 1970).
7measure, which also weights a percentage increase the same regardless of its recipient.22
Thus, it will not be reported separately here. But the similarity between this measure and
the Atkinson measure gives another justiﬁcation for the Atkinson measure.
Similarly, their second growth measure, the welfare or poverty-weighted growth rate
(which gives greater weight to income increases of the poor than the rich) is a discrete
approximation of a version of the Atkinson with ε > 1. The Atkinson measure with ε = 2
measure will therefore yield very similar results.
Before turning to the data and the results, it is important to brieﬂy discuss the most
important diﬀerences between the measures.23 Apart from the penalty applied to in-
equality, the two Gini-based measures diﬀer quite fundamentally from the two Atkinson
measures (and thus the Ahluwalia and Chenery measures) in ways that are important
to consider. As is already stated above, the Atkinson measures only consider individ-
ual incomes in an assessment of well-being while the Sen and Dagum measures consider
relative incomes, i.e. the income distribution itself has a separate impact on well-being
(apart from its impact on the levels of individual incomes). As a result, the two groups
of measures obey diﬀerent properties. While all measures are consistent with the Dal-
ton principle of transfers,24 the Atkinson measures additionally obeys a condition called
transfer sensitivity. An equal-sized transfer will have a larger impact on inequality (and
thus on welfare) if it happens among the poorer sections of the income distribution than
if it happens among richer sections (Sen, 1997). Most would agree that this is, at ﬁrst
blush, a desirable property. In contrast, the largest impact of an equal-sized transfer using
the Gini coeﬃcient will be among the mode of the income distribution, i.e. among middle
income groups. The diﬀerence occurs as these transfers will have the largest impact on
the rank of the people aﬀected by the transfer and thus the weights attached to their
incomes (see Atkinson, 1970; Blackorby and Donaldson, 1978). While many see this as
an undesirable property of the Gini-based measures, there is some empirical support that
such income comparisons at the mode of the distribution are indeed highly relevant for
welfare assessments.25
Secondly, the Atkinson measures are subgroup consistent (implying that any increase
in inequality in a subgroup will raise overall inequality and thus lower overall welfare),
they are consistent with the Pareto principle (an increase in income of one person, holding
all other incomes constant, will increase welfare) and are Generalized Lorenz Consistent
(if a Generalized Lorenz Curve of a distribution is somewhere above and nowhere below
the GLC of another distribution, welfare is higher in the former case). In contrast, none of
the Gini-based measures are sub-group consistent and the Dagum measure additionally
22It can be shown that the growth in the Atkinson measure with ε = 1 is simply the geometric mean
of the growth rates of individuals (or quintiles, depending on the unit of disaggregation), while the
population or equal weights measure is the arithmetic mean of the growth rates. For small numbers, one
is an approximation of the other. See Klasen (1994) for a discussion and application of the Ahluwalia and
Chenery measures.
23For a more extensive discussion of these issues, refer to Atkinson (1970), Blackorby and Donaldson
(1978), Sen (1997) and Dagum (1990).
24The Dalton principle of transfers says that the value of an inequality measure must fall by a transfer
from a richer person to a poorer person which does not reverse their position in the income ranking.
25For a recent study on these issues, see for example Graham and Pettinato (2002). Analysing data from
Peru (covering the period 1985-2000) and Russia (1995-1998), they found that relative income diﬀerences
seem to matter more for those in the middle of the distribution than for other income groups.
8violates the Pareto Principle and is not Generalized Lorenz Consistent (although this
only happens in rather extreme cases, see Dagum (1990)). There is some debate whether
sub-group consistency is a desirable property or not. While some support it as a logically
coherent requirement, others suggest that the impact of sub-group inequality on overall
inequality and welfare depends heavily on the relative position of that sub-group in the
overall income distribution (e.g. Sen, 1997; Dagum, 1990). Similarly, while the violation
of the Pareto and Generalized Lorenz Criterion of the Dagum measure might be seen
as problematic, a case can be made that such violations might be justiﬁed in extreme
circumstances.26
While the Atkinson measures thus have more desirably theoretical properties, the
experimental and empirical literature on inequality aversion and subjective well-being
generally seems to ﬁnd more support for the Gini-type measures.27 Regarding the size
of the penalty for inequality, there is virtual unanimity in the literature that inequality
aversion is empirically observed, but the size of the well-being penalty for inequality diﬀers
greatly among individual studies, ranging from values below to above the ones considered
here. It appears that studies that are investigating the impact of inequality on subjective
well-being ﬁnd larger inequality aversion than those based on experiments.28 But the
range of the penalty for inequality aversion considered here is well within the range found
in the experimental and empirical literature.
4 The Data
For the following analysis, the main source of data on inequality is the World Income
Inequality Database version 1.0 (WIID, 2000), which provides more than 5.000 Gini co-
eﬃcients and associated distributions for 151 countries. To get recent data for developing
countries as well as some OECD countries, Gini coeﬃcients and income shares published
by the World Bank’s Poverty Monitor (World Bank, 2002a) and provided by the Luxem-
bourg Income Study (LIS, 2000) are added.29 In WIID all observations are classiﬁed as
either ’reliable’ or ’less reliable’. Only observations which are categorised as ’reliable’ and
represent the entire population of a country are considered.30 Table 5 in the appendix
shows a selection of the Gini coeﬃcients used for 5 benchmark years. One particular
problem with the intertemporal and international compatibility of these Gini coeﬃcients
is the changes in the income concept and unit upon which they are based.31 To address
this issue, we also make a regression-based adjustment of the Gini-coeﬃcients to all base
26For example, if the richest person in society got a bit richer, the Pareto and Generalized Lorenz
Criterion suggest an improvement of welfare. One might, however, plausibly argue that everyone else is
worse oﬀ due to the greater distance they now have to the richest person and that this negative eﬀect
might outweigh the positive eﬀect of the higher mean income. For a discussion, see Dagum (1990).
27See, for example, Amiel, Creedy, and Hurn (1999); Easterlin (1995); Alesina, Di Tella, and MacCulloch
(2002).
28See for example Amiel, Creedy, and Hurn (1999); Blanchﬂower and Oswald (2003); Alesina, Di Tella,
and MacCulloch (2002); Stodder (1991); Schwarze and H¨ arpfer (2002).
29Our special thanks go to David Jesuit and Tim Smeeding for kindly providing the most recent data
of several OECD countries.
30For a more detailed characterisation of the inequality data used, see also Gr¨ un and Klasen (2003).
31For a more thorough discussion of these issues, see Gr¨ un and Klasen (2003) and Atkinson and
Brandolini (2001).
9them on the gross income per person concept. The regression is based on all ’reliable’
Gini coeﬃcients in the WIID database and is reproduced in Table 6 in the appendix.
Throughout we use the original as well as the adjusted Gini coeﬃcients for comparative
purposes.32
Regarding income data one could consider per capita income, per capita disposable
income, or per capita consumption (from national accounts or from household surveys).
To get the largest possible sample and to compare ourselves directly to per capita income
as the commonly used welfare indicator, we rely on per capita gross national product33
as presented in the national accounts as the income concept used. To compare changes in
well-being across time, we use real per capita GNP in local currency units, as reported in
the WDI (2002). Whenever it is necessary to make international or global comparisons,
we use purchasing power adjusted real GNP per capita data provided by the Penn World
Table (PWT), version 6.1 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002).
For the calculation of global well-being and changes thereof between 1970 and 1998,
we start by using a sub sample which consists of 73 countries representing 81 per cent
percent of the world population in 1998 for which we had at least two inequality obser-
vations between 1970 and 1998. In order to reach such coverage and include some of the
populous and high population growth African and Middle Eastern countries, it was neces-
sary to assume in some cases that income inequality remained stable for sub-periods and
only income growth changed, as more data are available on the latter than the former.34
However, the main analysis disregards many of the formerly socialist countries since the
PWT do not provide suﬃcient information to calculate PPP adjusted per capita income
for this group of countries in the given period. Since many of them experienced a con-
siderable worsening in income inequality during the transition period (Milanovic, 1998;
Gr¨ un and Klasen, 2001), ignoring them in a global analysis of well-being may yield ﬂawed
results. Therefore, we expand the sample by 15 Eastern European countries and succes-
sor states of the Soviet Union, covering now 85 per cent of the world population, and
make a second analysis of global well-being for the years 1988 and 1998 by using GNI per
capita in PPP terms provided by WDI (2002).35 For both samples we calculated average
income per quintile for each country, sorted them in ascending order to generate global
income quintiles, and then calculated average incomes of these world quintiles based on
32We do not make a similar adjustment for quintile shares, which involves a number of diﬃcult con-
ceptual and econometric issues.
33Gross national product should better capture welfare of the population than gross domestic product
as the former includes earnings from abroad and excludes earnings by foreigners. We could also rely
on consumption means from household surveys, but this is unavailable for many of our data points.
Also, there are large and generally not well understood discrepancies between survey means and national
accounts consumption data. The choice to use per capita income will inﬂuence the results on the global
inequality analysis as shown by Milanovic (2002). For a discussion, see below and also Ravallion (2002).
34The list of countries included can be deduced from Table 5 in the appendix. All countries with at
least two observations in the period 1970-1998 are included, with the exception of Bulgaria (no income
data) and Sierra Leone (assuming stability of income distribution during a prolonged civil war seems
problematic).
35In particular, we include in addition Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan. Data on income inequality for the pre-transition period are mainly taken from Milanovic
(1998); for the year 1998 we again rely on WIID (2000).
10the population-weighted country quintiles contained in each world quintile.36 These com-
putations result in average incomes per ’world quintile’ based on which we calculated the
Atkinson measure with ε = 1 and ε = 2.
5 Within-Country Well-Being Comparisons over Time
As shown in detail in Gr¨ un and Klasen (2003), the application of the proposed mea-
sures has a signiﬁcant impact on levels of well-being. Compared to per capita income,
our inequality-adjusted well-being measures are between 15-70% lower, depending on the
country and the measure used. So while these measures have a signiﬁcant impact on re-
ported levels of well-being, we investigate here whether they change our impression of
changes in well-being. To do that, we need to investigate to what extent inequality has
changed over time.
To get a ﬁrst impression of trends in inequality, Table 1 shows average Gini coeﬃcients
from the 1960s to the 1990s. What emerges is, on the whole, a great deal of stability
(see also Deininger and Squire, 1998; Lundberg and Squire, 2001). At the same time,
there appears to be a noticeable decline in inequality in the 1970s and 1980s and an
increase in the 1990s.37 Since these trends could be driven by compositional changes in
the income deﬁnition used, Column 3 therefore summarizes adjusted Gini coeﬃcients
which are now all based on the same speciﬁcation, namely gross income per person.38 The
average adjusted Gini coeﬃcient is somewhat higher (as expected), but follows the same
if somewhat muted temporal trend as the original one. Within-country inequality appears
to have fallen in the 1970s and 1980s and to have risen in the 1990s.39
To investigate this matter further, Table 2 presents the results of a regression analy-
sis.40 As a ﬁrst step we investigate, controlling for country speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and using
only adjusted Gini coeﬃcients, whether there are temporal trends in inequality.41 Speciﬁ-
cation (1) shows the results using decade dummies. While the general impression of great
stability is supported by the regression, inequality appears to have fallen in the 1970s and
36When a country quintile straddles the line between two world quintiles, the country quintile was
proportionately allocated to ensure that the world quintiles contain equal population numbers.
37As the Gini coeﬃcient is based on a sample, one could, in theory, construct conﬁdence intervals to
then better assess the signiﬁcance of reported trends. Unfortunately, the sample sizes are generally not
reported in the WIID database. But the vast majority of Gini coeﬃcients come from household surveys
which typically sample 3000-10000 households. In these orders of magnitude, the conﬁdence intervals of
these Gini coeﬃcients are very small so that many of the changes in inequality are likely to be signiﬁcant
(Giles, 2002).
38To adjust all Gini coeﬃcients on this particular speciﬁcation, regression results from Gr¨ un and Klasen
(2003), reproduced as Appendix Table 6 were used. Gini coeﬃcients are regressed on the income deﬁnition
and reference unit to determine systematic diﬀerences related to the speciﬁcation the Gini coeﬃcients.
See Appendix Table 5 for the unadjusted and adjusted Gini coeﬃcients.
39For a related discussion, see Cornia and Court (2001).
40For this and the following regression analysis, we use the entire ’reliable’ data set from WIID, but only
consider one observation per country and time to avoid biasing our standard errors. If several observations
are available, we take the one based on gross income per person (or the next best available).
41All estimations were also calculated using the random eﬀects model, where the results of the coeﬃ-
cients were virtually identical to the ﬁxed eﬀect results reported here. As we are substantively interested
in inequality trends within a country over time, we report only the ﬁxed eﬀects results.
111980s and risen again in the 1990s (the left-out category). As illustrated by speciﬁcation
(2), transition countries play a signiﬁcant role in determining this trend. The coeﬃcients
of all interaction variables indicate that inequality was considerably lower for this group
of countries in the 1960s through 1980s than in the 1990s where it increased sharply.
But even excluding the transition countries, inequality was still lower in all non-transition
countries in the 1970s and 1980s than in the 1990s, although the coeﬃcients only approach
signiﬁcance in those two decades.
The next two speciﬁcations investigate this issue parametrically by including a time
trend and its square, one including (speciﬁcation (3)) and one excluding transition coun-
tries (speciﬁcation (4)). The time trend and its square is highly signiﬁcant suggesting
a U-pattern of within-country inequality over time, thus suggesting reversal of earlier
declines in inequality. This gives some conﬁrmation to the claim by Cornia and Court
(2001), that there has been a more generalized reversal of within-country inequality in
many countries of the world in the 1980s and 1990s (beyond the well-known cases of
the US, UK, and transition countries). While this is a signiﬁcant ﬁnding, the magnitude
of the reversal should not be overemphasized. Figure 1 shows a locally weighted (non-
parametric) regression of time (where 1 refers to 1960 and 39 to 1998) and the changes
in inequality in a country.42 While the falling inequality up until the mid-1980s and its
subsequent reversal is clearly visible, the size of the decline and the subsequent reversal
is not very large, amounting to about a 4 point drop and a subsequent 3 point increase.
There is also a hint that the increase might have stabilized in the mid-1990s, and the
Figure demonstrates clearly that this average performance hides a great deal of variation.
If this trend reversal turns out to be a robust ﬁnding, it has a signiﬁcant impact on
changes in well-being across time. Using the Sen measure and applying it to the results in
Figure 1 even this relatively modest development would have understated average well-
being growth in the 1960s to the 1980s by an average of about 4 percentage points, and
overstated well-being growth since the 1980s by about 3 percentage points. Using the
Dagum or the Atkinson (ε=2) measure would lead to a more substantial reassessment.
Moreover, as shown below, the reversals in inequality were much larger in some countries
where they lead to a dramatic reassessment of well-being growth in recent decades.
In Table 3 we apply ﬁxed eﬀects regressions to the sample of adjusted Gini coeﬃ-
cients to test for an intertemporal Kuznets curve, i.e. the hypothesis that as countries
go through the process of development, inequality ﬁrst worsens and then improves again.
The results are quite clear here. There is not even the smallest hint for such an inverse
U relationship that would hold systematically across all countries (see also Deininger and
Squire, 1998; Lundberg and Squire, 2001). In fact, speciﬁcations (2) and (3) rather sug-
gest the opposite, namely a U shaped relationship, even though it is not a very distinct
curve. To corroborate this ﬁnding, we additionally regressed the sample of adjusted Gini
coeﬃcients on a constant term only, assuming country speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. The residuals
capturing the time varying component of the Gini coeﬃcients were then used as the de-
pendent variable in a locally weighted regression. Figure 2 plots the result. Inequality ﬁrst
decreases with average income, but for income levels between approximately $17,000 and
42This is achieved by running a ﬁxed eﬀects regressions of the adjusted Gini coeﬃcients without co-
variates, plot the residuals of that regression against time, and then run a non-parametric regression of
those residuals against time.
12$26,000 (i.e. high income countries), it rises again.43 While the absence of an inverse-U
has been commented upon extensively (e.g. Deininger and Squire (1996, 1998), there has
been no discussion of the reverse relationship that seems to hold, on average, across a
large spectrum of countries. Since per capita-income and time are, for most countries,
positively correlated with each other, the ﬁndings from Figure 1 and 2 might be closely
related so that it is a priori unclear whether the inequality trend is mostly a temporal
trend or related to income growth. Regressions (4) through (6) investigate this by includ-
ing both income and time. All three speciﬁcations seem to suggest that the income-U, i.e.
declining and then rising income inequality, remains highly signiﬁcant and robust even if
we control for time. The temporal U also remains signiﬁcant when the transition countries
are included, but only approaches signiﬁcance when they are excluded. Thus we conﬁrm
ﬁndings regarding inequality-reversals over time found by Cornia and Court (2001), but
we additionally ﬁnd strong evidence for a U-shaped relationship between income and in-
equality in the 1960-1998 time period. We know of no theoretical explanations that could
account for such a systematic relationship, which clearly merits further investigation.
Turning to a few country experiences using our inequality-adjusted measures shows
a great diversity of experiences.44 It also demonstrates that even in countries where in-
equality remained stable over a long period of time, there often were signiﬁcant changes
in sub-periods. Figures 3 and 4 plot two typical examples. While Brazil and Indonesia
diﬀer greatly with respect to the degree of existing inequality, the income distributions
itself did, in a relative sense, not vary a lot in the last decades. This results in com-
paratively small diﬀerences between an income growth rate and the growth rate of the
distribution-adjusted income measures (illustrated by similar height of the ﬁrst columns
of each measure). At the same time, this general stability masks some increases and de-
clines in inequality in those countries. For example, in Brazil income distribution appears
to have become notably more unequal between 1961 and 1990. In the sub-period 1981-
1989, this trend was accompanied by only moderate income growth leading not only to
smaller, but negative growth rates in the inequality-adjusted welfare measures. In 1997,
income inequality was at an all-time low and positive growth rates are reported for all
measures for the period 1990-1997. Thus, one should not interpret longer-term stability
as the absence of any developments in sub-periods (see also Atkinson and Brandolini,
2001). Canada and Finland are two other examples where changes in inequality diﬀered
in diﬀerent time periods (Figures 5 and 6). Finland is particularly notable for the fact that
inequality appears to have declined considerably since the 1980s leading to higher changes
in well-being once inequality is considered. The case of China (Figure 7) illustrates the
combination of high growth and worsening inequality. In both time periods considered,
income growth overstates well-being growth by 0.5-1.5 percentage points per year, with
the diﬀerences being larger in the 1990s. Finally, Sri Lanka (Figure 8) is a typical exam-
ple of a U-shaped pattern of inequality. From 1964-1980, inequality fell and as a result,
well-being growth exceeded income growth by 1-2.5 percentage points. In the 1980s, only
the Gini-based measures report further declines in inequality and thus large expansions
of well-being, suggesting that middle income groups were beneﬁtting particularly. In the
43While details of the curve, particularly its smoothness and the wiggle at low income levels are partly
driven by the technical parameters of the locally weighted regression, including the weighting function
and the bandwidth, the overall impression of a U is not aﬀected by changing these parameters.
44All Gini-based measures are based on Ginis that have been standardized in the manner described
above. Using unstandardized Ginis would not change the results signiﬁcantly.
131990s, inequality increased and well-being therefore grew by up to two percentage points
less than suggested by the income growth measure. The diﬀerent measures disagree about
which period led to the largest expansion of well-being. The Atkinson measures would
suggest the 1964-1980 period was most successful, the Gini-based measures the 1981-1990
period, and the income growth measure the 1991-1995 period. Incorporating inequality in
an assessment clearly matters for intertemporal comparisons.
Lastly, we want to brieﬂy highlight the impact of applying distribution-sensitive mea-
sures to the more well-known cases of inequality reversals, the US, UK, and transition
countries. The impact of inequality on changes in well-being in the US was already exam-
ined in Klasen (1994). Here, the analysis is extended to the year 2000 and some additional
measures are presented. Data on (money family) income and inequality are taken from
the Current Population Survey data from the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Census, 2002).45
Figure 9 shows the basic results. During the 1950s and the 1960s, high annual growth was
accompanied by falling inequality which ensures that increases in well-being were consid-
erably above the income growth rate. In contrast, in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, low to
moderate income growth was accompanied by sharply rising inequality so that well-being
grew by negligible amounts. In fact, it shrank in the 1980s, using some of the measures.46
Since economic growth was particularly high between 1993-2000, one may wonder how
well-being changed in the so-called ’new economy.’ Figure 10 gives an impression. Since
1993, income growth has been still somewhat below the high growth rates of the 1960s, and
inequality continues to worsen (although at a much slower pace) in the 1980s. This time, it
is more due to greater income increases among the rich, rather than deteriorations among
the poor which was the case in the 1980s. This rising inequality means that well-being
in the ’New Economy’ was growing considerably more slowly than in the much-maligned
1960s where high growth was accompanied by falling inequality.
The story for Britain looks much the same (Figure 11). The income data is again taken
from the World Bank (WDI, 2002) but now combined with inequality series produced
by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS) covering the time span 1961-2000.47 Looking at
the total period, changes in well-being become gradually smaller when more and more
importance is attached to the existing inequality. But again, the development within
sub periods was highly diverse. In the ﬁrst two decades, moderate income growth was
accompanied by falling inequality thus leading to larger increases in well-being. In the
1980s, moderate income growth translated into stagnation of well-being once the sharply
rising inequality is accounted for (see also Atkinson, 1997). Since the early 1990s, the
distribution-adjusted measures remain below the per capita income growth rate, but the
diﬀerence is not large, suggesting that inequality has worsened only slightly since then.
The impact of incorporating distribution-sensitive measures to changes in well-being in
transition countries was discussed in detail in Gr¨ un and Klasen (2001). There we showed
that the impact of worsening inequality increased the cumulative welfare loss in transition
45For a more detailed description of the data source see Klasen (1994).
46Also here, one can see the diﬀerence between the Gini-based measures and the Atkinson measures.
The poorest did particularly badly in the 1980s and the Atkinson measure with ε = 2 shows a deterioration
in well-being.
47Gini coeﬃcients and income shares by decile group (based on before housing costs) are kindly provided
by Jayne Taylor and Alissa Goodman.
14countries between 1988 and 1995 by between 4 (Hungary) and 40 (Kyrgyzstan) percentage
points, compared to an income growth measure. As a result, well-being fell by as much
as 70 percentage points in Ukraine and the Kyrgyzstan, if the worsening inequality is
factored in.
To brieﬂy summarize, the analysis has shown that our distribution-sensitive mea-
sures signiﬁcantly aﬀect our impression of changes in well-being, compared to an income
growth indicator. They do so particularly dramatically in the US, the UK, and transition
countries, but also alter the impression of changes in well-being in many countries over
particular sub-periods. We also ﬁnd that, on average, there appears to be a U-trend in
the evolution of inequality over time with a signiﬁcant increase in inequality observed in
the 1990s. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze potential causes for this trend,
but it clearly warrants serious attention.48
But examination of Figures 1 and 2 as well individual country experiences suggest
there is great variation around this trend, suggesting that the rise in inequality in the
1990s is far from inevitable. It thus appears that increasing income inequality observed
in some industrialized and transition countries are not inevitable global processes.49 The
diﬀerences in experiences rather suggest that the role of economic policy in generating
and combating income inequality is quite considerable, but a more careful investigation
of these issues is clearly needed (see also Atkinson, 1997; Aghion and Williamson, 1999;
Cornia and Court, 2001).
6 Global Well-Being and Inequality
As is well-known, global inequality is more a result of inequality between nations than
inequality within nations (e.g. Anand, 1993; Berry, Bourguignon, and Morrison, 1991;
Milanovic, 2002). The richest 20 per cent of the world consume some 70-80 per cent of
world income (depending on the calculation and the countries included), leaving some 2-3
per cent to the poorest 20 per cent, which is far larger than the discrepancy between the
rich and poor in any one country (UNDP, 1999; Milanovic, 2002). As a result, one would
expect that consideration of this inequality between nations should have a considerable
impact on measures of well-being. Figure 12, based on a sample which captures some 81 per
cent of the world population in 1998 (but leaving out quite a few of the poorest countries as
well as many transition countries) shows that it does indeed. Using the Atkinson measures,
world well-being is less than half of world per capita income if applying ε = 1 and only
about a quarter if ε = 2 is assumed for all the years considered. This is to say that world
well-being would be the same if world per capita income was only half or even a quarter
of its present levels but distributed equally. Including the missing poor and transition
countries, even more dramatic reductions in well-being as a result of inequality would
48Cornia and Court (2001) argue that neo-liberal economic policy reforms in rich and poor countries
were a signiﬁcant factor in causing this inequality reversal. The empirical basis for this assessment is
quite weak at present and clearly merits further investigation.
49Based on the LIS, Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000) ﬁnd that in the majority of OECD countries,
there was some increase in inequality since the 1980s. But timing and extent diﬀered greatly and it was
far from being a universal phenomenon. See also Ayala, Martinez, and Ruiz-Huerta (2001).
15occur. Global inequality is thus not just a political, economic, and social problem, it is a
welfare problem as it reduces aggregate global well-being considerably.
Figures 12 and 13 examines changes in global well-being between 1970 and 1998,
comparing growth in per capita income (’mean’) and growth in the two inequality-adjusted
Atkinson measures. Between 1970 and 1980, the Atkinson measures show slightly smaller
increases, suggesting a slightly worsening global inequality. Conversely, the growth of the
Atkinson measures far surpasses the growth in mean global income in the 1980s and 1990s,
suggesting declining inequality. In the 1980s, it does so particularly when ε = 2 is used,
suggesting that the poorest beneﬁted particularly from growth then. This is mostly due
to high and fairly evenly spread per capita growth in China and India, as well as high
growth in other dynamic Asian economies which push up income growth of the poorest
three quintiles of the world income distribution, as Figure 13 shows (see also Schultz,
1998). In contrast, in the 1990s, growth in the poorest world quintile was relatively small,
and it was the middle quintiles which prospered particularly, while the richest quintile had
relatively modest income gains. The relatively modest performance of the poorest quintile
is due to the poor performance of African economies, and the widening inequality in India
and China, while the middle incomes represent richer quintiles in India and China as well
as prospering East Asian economies. As now African country quintiles make up most of
the poorest world quintile, it is unlikely that the benign trend of falling global inequality
of the 1980s and 1990s will persist, unless African countries will be able to signiﬁcantly
improve their growth performance and improve their income distribution.
Looking at the results for 1988-98 obtained from the expanded sample which also
includes 15 transition countries, it becomes clear, that the assessment of global inequality
and well-being is to some extent driven by sample size, the period considered, and the
choice of income data. Figure 14 illustrates the well-being changes between 1988 and 1998
for this second global analysis. The qualitative ﬁndings are largely the same, suggesting
declining inequality between 1988 and 1998 which was particularly due to high income
growth in the second and third world quintile. From a quantitative perspective, results do
diﬀer from those shown in Figure 13. Income growth per global quintile was smaller for all
quintiles and the richest 20 per cent even had declining per capita incomes. The overall
mean income remains nearly unchanged, while the Atkinson measures indicate positive
growth rates.
The two main reasons for the diﬀerences in results are the inclusion of transition
countries and the switch from the PPP income data from the PWT to the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators. As the World Bank’s PPP data are based on an earlier
ICP survey (1993) than the Penn World Table data (1996), the latter are likely to more
accurately reﬂect PPP-adjusted income changes in the 1990s.50
50As already shown in previous studies, the World Bank’s calculation assumes that incomes in many
of the poorer countries are somewhat lower than in the Penn World Tables (e.g. Gr¨ un and Klasen, 2003).
But not only levels, also growth rates diﬀer considerably between the two data sources. Calculating the
average change in per capita income of those countries included in both analyses between 1988 and
1998, income growth amounted to 21.1 per cent according to the PWT, but account for only 6.5 per
cent when using the World Bank data. This lower growth rate, however, is not uniform across world
quintiles. Although all quintiles experienced lower income growth according to the World Bank data,
the diﬀerences are particularly large for the two richest quintiles. Once the transition countries are also
considered, compositional changes of global quintiles seem to further add to the negative income growth
16Apart from investigating changes in the global income distribution and its impact on
well-being, one can also assess mobility of countries within the global income distribution.
Table 4 illustrates how many country quintiles fall into the particular global quintiles
and what changes took place between 1970 and 1998. According to the admittedly rather
crude measure, there seems to be a great deal of stability, since 218 out of the 365 country
quintiles belong to the same world quintile in both years.51 Furthermore, this stability is
very much concentrated at the lower and upper tail of the world income distribution,
consistent with a bi-modal distribution of world incomes (see also Quah, 1993). In case of
the richest global quintile this ﬁnding can be attributed to many OECD economies, which,
except for their poorest country quintiles, already succeeded in 1970 to belong entirely to
this income group. Turning to the bottom end, most African countries considered in this
analysis could not escape the lowest quintile in the global income distribution.52 Among
the populations that managed to move upwards and reach the highest income category in
1998 are the second to fourth quintiles of Korea as well as the poorest three quintiles of
Singapore. Similar upward mobility can be observed for most quintiles in China, Malaysia,
and Thailand, while in many African countries like Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda as well as
Bangladesh, Colombia, and Guatemala, most quintiles experienced downward mobility. In
1998, their country quintiles are found among poorer global quintiles than in 1970. Thus
despite overall rigidity in the world income distribution, there is considerable mobility for
selected countries.
Thus, in line with some other work (e.g. Schultz, 1998) but in contrast to ﬁndings from
studies by UNDP (1999) and Milanovic (2002), there has not been a uniform rise in global
inequality, nor has there been no mobility of countries up and down the world income
distribution.53 Including even more of the poorest countries would, however, somewhat
temper this assessment as they are likely to have contributed to increasing global inequal-
ity and less mobility. Moreover, the future of global inequality will depend much less on
economic performance in India and China and more on growth and income distribution
in Africa.
Clearly, global inequality is associated with major reductions in well-being. In fact,
the reductions are larger than similar reductions within countries since inter-country in-
equality is so much larger than intra-country inequality. At the same time, high growth in
China and India, where most of the world’s poor live, and considerably mobility suggest
that we are not necessarily facing a world of rising and ever more rigid global distribution.
of the richest quintile. In 1988, the majority of country quintiles of the transition countries belonged to
the fourth and ﬁfth global quintiles. By 1998, the transition economies considered here have experienced
an average income loss of 37 per cent, thus contributing to the declines in these quintiles.
51In fact, income mobility is much higher, since there is a lot variability within each world quintile.
52The increasing number of country quintiles falling into the poorest world quintile is mainly due to
the fact that the second poorest quintile of China could climb into the next income category, leaving
room for many more smaller country quintiles to fall into the ﬁrst.
53Milanovic (2002) uses micro data to generate estimates for global inequality in 1988 and 1993. He
ﬁnds sharply rising global inequality. The diﬀerence between his and our ﬁnding is probably due to the
choice of time period, the large representation of transition economies in his data set, and the use of mean
income ﬁgure that is based on micro data and may bear little resemblance with national accounts data
used here. For a discussion of national accounts versus survey data see also Ravallion (2002).
177 Concluding Remarks
From a theoretical point of view, the inclusion of income inequality in a measure of well-
being is well justiﬁed. Empirical studies conﬁrm the hypothesis that individual and thus
aggregate welfare is negatively aﬀected if incomes are more widely dispersed. Here, we
tried to show that the impression of well-being across time and at the global level derived
from inequality-adjusted measures sometimes drastically diﬀers from the one obtained
when looking at the mean income solely.
The intertemporal analysis has shown an average worsening of the within-country
income distribution in the 1990s, after earlier improvements in the 1960s to the 1980s.
While the causes are somewhat unclear and merit further investigation, the consequence is
that changes in well-being in the 1990s are overstated using an income indicator. But the
analysis also demonstrated that there is great variation in experiences (between countries
and sub-periods) suggesting that the average trend has not uniformly aﬀected all countries.
The source of this variation in experiences also merits further analysis.
Due to the extremely large global income inequality, global well-being is very much
lower than it would be if incomes were more equally distributed. On the other hand, for
both samples of countries considered (which unfortunately exclude many of the poorest
countries) changes in global well-being are larger than suggested by the income growth
measure especially since the 1980s where global inequality seems to have declined. But
the global analysis also illustrates that sample composition and source of data have a
signiﬁcant impact on the size of the eﬀects. Finally, comparing the composition of global
income quintiles in 1970 and 1998, it is clear that some countries moved upwards and
downwards the world income distribution, suggesting that there is scope for economic
policy to aﬀect one position in the global distribution.
It is important to end the analysis with a caveat. While we have shown that most
of our results are quite robust to the choice of income and distribution data, both data
continue to suﬀer from deﬁciencies in comparability, consistency, and reliability. This is
particularly the case for income distribution data which are still often of poor quality
and reported at irregular intervals with inconsistent methods. While the World Income
Inequality Database has greatly facilitated access to income distribution data, future
developments should be directed at improvements in their quality, consistency, and time-
liness.
18Table 1: Average Gini Coeﬃcients over Time
Average Number of
Year Average Gini adjusted Gini observations
1960s 37.9 38.6 197
1970s 34.9 36.2 422
1980s 32.8 34.7 763
1990s 34.5 36.8 651
Adjusted Gini coeﬃcients are based on the same speciﬁcation,
gross income per person. For calculating adjusted Gini coeﬃcients,
regression results to determine the inﬂuence of diﬀerent
speciﬁcations shown in Table 6 in the appendix were used.
Table 2: Temporal and Regional Trends in Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 39.91∗∗ (0.25) 39.78∗∗ (0.25) 41.19∗∗ (0.63) 42.22∗∗ (0.63)
1960s 0.20 (0.50) 0.18 (0.50) - -
1970s -1.03∗ (0.42) -0.58 (0.43) - -
1980s -1.04∗∗ (0.36) -0.59 (0.38) - -
TC * 1960s - -7.53 (4.14) - -
TC * 1970s - -5.02∗∗ (1.70) - -
TC * 1980s - -3.59∗∗ (1.11) - -
Time - - -0.27∗∗ (0.06) -0.19∗∗ (0.06)
Time2 - - 0.01∗∗ (0.00) 0.00∗∗ (0.00)
N 974 974 974 837
R2 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%; Standard errors in parentheses.
Although for all speciﬁcations the Hausman test favoured random eﬀects, the
estimations shown here are ﬁxed eﬀects as we are primarily interested in country
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Adjusted Gini coeﬃcients are used as dependent variable.
Speciﬁcation (4) excludes transition countries (TC). Reference category is the period
1990-1998.
19Table 3: Kuznets Curve? Trends in Income and its Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 39.63∗∗ (0.19) 43.18∗∗ (1.04) 45.15∗∗ (1.07) 44.84∗∗ (1.37) 44.62∗∗ (1.08) 45.966∗∗ (1.14)
Income/capita -0.01 (0.06) -0.80∗∗ (0.20) -0.94∗∗ (0.20) -0.91∗∗ (0.22) -0.91∗∗ (0.23) -0.984∗∗ (0.24)
Income/capita, inverse -0.58 (1.32) - - - - -
Income/capita, squared - 0.03∗∗ (0.01) 0.03∗∗ (0.01) 0.03∗∗ (0.01) 0.02∗∗ (0.01) 0.030∗∗ (0.01)
1960s - - - -1.13† (0.65) - -
1970s - - - -1.38∗∗ (0.48) - -
1980s - - - -1.04∗∗ (0.37) - -
Time - - - - -0.17∗ (0.07) -0.086 (0.07)
Time2 - - - - 0.01∗∗ (0.00) 0.003† (0.00)
N 974 974 837 974 974 837
R2 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
Signiﬁcance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%; Standard errors in parentheses.
All speciﬁcations estimate ﬁxed eﬀects. In speciﬁcations (4) and (7) transition countries are excluded.
2
0Table 4: Income Mobility between World Quintiles, 1970-1998
1998
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1st 41 3 1 0 0
2nd 21 16 4 0 0
1970 3rd 12 13 13 7 0
4th 2 8 34 45 33
5th 0 0 0 9 103
Rows and columns show the number of country
quintiles falling into the ﬁrst to ﬁfth world
quintile in 1970 and 1998, respectively.
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bandwidth = .3
Notes: Time=1 refers to 1960, time=39 to 1998.
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Notes: The income concept applied is real GNP per capita, 1996 prices (Heston, Summers, and Aten,
2002).









GDP/cap Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen Dagum
1961-97 1961-80 1981-89 1990-97
Notes: The income concept used here is GDP per capita at market prices in constant local currency
(WDI, 2002). For the Sen and Dagum measures, adjusted Gini coeﬃcients were used.









GDP/cap Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen Dagum
1977-95 1977-80 1981-90 1991-95
Notes: See Figure 3.










GDP/cap Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen Dagum
 1966-98 1966-79 1980-91 1992-98
Notes: See Figure 3.












GDP/cap Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen Dagum
1967-97 1967-77 1978-87 1988-97
Notes: See Figure 3.







GDP/cap Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen Dagum
1981-97 1981-90 1991-97
Notes: See Figure 3.








GDP/cap Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen Dagum
1964-95 1964-80 1981-90 1991-95
Notes: See Figure 3.












Mean Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen  Dagum
1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99
Notes: Calculations are based on U.S. census data (constant 1982 dollars). Mean refers to the mean
money income of families.








Poorest 20% Richest 20% Mean Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen Dagum
1961-1968 1993-2000
Notes: See Figure 9.








GDP/cap Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen Dagum
1962-2000 1962-1969 1970-1979 1980-1991 1992-2000
Notes:The income concept used here is GDP per capita at market prices in constant local currency (WDI,
2002). The Ginis and quintile shares are based on the before housing costs series provided by the Institute
for Fiscal Studies.











1970 1980 1990 1998
Notes: The ﬁrst ﬁve columns correspond to the ﬁve global quintiles. Mean refers to the overall per capita
income.
















Notes: See Figure 12.
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1988-1998


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Country Code 1960 1970 1980 1990 1998
Zambia ZMB 1959 (48.0; 48.0) - 1976 (51.0; 51.8) 1991 (48.3; 51.1)a 1996 (49.8; 53.6)
Zimbabwe ZWE - - - 1990 (56.8; 60.7) -
Notes: Original Gini coeﬃcients and adjusted Gini coeﬃcients based on gross income per person are in parentheses.
If not otherwise indicated, data are taken from WIID (2000).
a: Data taken from the World Bank (World Bank, 2002a).
b: Data are kindly provided by David Jesuit and Tim Smeeding (LIS).
3
2Table 6: Determinants of Gini Coeﬃcients
(1) (2)
Expenditure -3.85∗∗ (0.39) -3.57∗∗ (0.38)
Net income -1.84∗∗ (0.27) 1.38∗∗ (0.48)
Unknown income 1.24 (1.64) 1.39 (1.61)
Household 1.06∗∗ (0.28) 1.14∗∗ (0.27)
Family 0.64 (0.45) 0.70 (0.44)
Unknown reference unit -1.24 (1.62) -1.19 (1.60)
Equivalized -4.65∗∗ (0.30) -4.35∗∗ (0.29)
Primary source unknown 1.79∗∗ (0.63) 1.88∗∗ (0.62)
No consistent source -0.39 (0.25) -0.44 (0.24)
OECD * Net income - -4.64∗∗ (0.56)
Intercept 36.08∗∗ (0.27) 35.92∗∗ (0.26)
N 2033 2033
R2 0.21 0.23
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%; Standard errors in parentheses.
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